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AD NUMBER	
AD501469	
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TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited	
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization..Department of the Army, Attn: Public Affairs Office, Washington, DC 20310.	
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 23 Jan 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 23 Jan 1976	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Apr 69) FOR OT-UT-691222

22 April 1969

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry
Division Artillery (U). ~~Rating of 1-3-69~~

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be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and
may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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9th Infantry Division Artillery

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-AO

31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WP-3-AA)(U)

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
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Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

1. (C) Unit Operations

a. General. Throughout the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the 9th Division Artillery supported the widely spread operations of the Division. No major changes in the nature of Division operations, as described in the previous ORLL, occurred during the period. Each brigade continued to exploit helicopter mobility, conducting as many as ten insertions daily. Contacts with the enemy were generally small, involving enemy platoons or squads. In order to support the decentralized and fast moving tactics of the maneuver forces, the artillery battalions were forced to continue the practice of splitting batteries frequently. Although several batteries were subjected to mortar attacks and a few to standoff attacks by small arms and rocket fire, no attempts to overrun battery positions occurred. Further, no barge or truck convoys were ambushed. Because of the lack of non-divisional artillery support in the 1st and 2nd Brigade Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI), the artillery units supporting

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
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those brigades were obliged to move every day. Two non-divisional 155mm Batteries, with the mission of general support reinforcing (GSR) the 9th Division Artillery, were located in the 3rd Brigade's TAOI, significantly reducing the requirement to displace artillery in that area. Although the dry season began during the period, availability of suitable positions from which to support the infantry continued to be a difficult though not insurmountable problem. No significant curtailments of brigade operations were necessitated by the wet terrain and paucity of non-divisional artillery in the Division's TAOI. Although, the 1st and 2nd Brigades were forced occasionally to operate outside of US artillery fans.

b. 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery (1-11 Arty). The Battalion continued its mission of providing direct support to the 3rd Brigade in Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces until 13 November 1968. On that date, the 1st and 3rd Brigades exchanged TAOIs and the 1-11 Arty assumed the mission of direct support (DS) to the 1st Brigade. The decision to leave the DS battalions in place was based primarily on the advantages of maintaining geographic familiarity and continuity of relationships with Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and Government of Vietnam (GVN) clearance and intelligence agencies. Further, the artillery forward observers (FO), liaison officers (LNO) and battalion staff were able to provide significant assistance to the relocated brigade. In addition to supporting operations targeted against the enemy's offensive capability, the 1-11 Arty contributed fire support to the defense of Dong Tam Base in Area of Operations (AO) Kudzu. The Brigade's TAOI, composed of two provinces, was extremely large, and operations were also conducted in three adjacent provinces. As a result, the 1-11 Arty continued to split batteries frequently and for extended periods. During the period, batteries were split 24 times for a total of 131 battery days. Individual batteries were required to remain in a split configuration for periods as long as sixteen days. On 6 January, the 1st Brigade conducted a night encirclement operation west of Giao Duc. A tactical emergency was declared so that C/1-11 Arty could be immediately airlifted to WS 822472 where they expended over 600 rounds in support of the operation. The artillery fire resulted in more than 20 secondary explosions. The operation ended on 7 January with a body count of 38 VC. Battery B, 1st Battalion 84th Artillery continued GSR to the 1-11 Arty and frequently operated in a split configuration.

c. 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery (3-34 Arty). As part of the Mobile Riverine Force, the Battalion continued to provide support to the 2nd Brigade. 2nd Brigade activity was characterized by air and water mobile reconnaissance-in-force and pacification operations throughout Kien Hoa Province. The 3-34 Arty operated with A and B Batteries mounted on barges, while C Battery operated from artillery firing platforms at Fire Support Base Klaw II (XS6029). On 20 December, Battery A, 3-34 Arty was attached

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to the 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (6-77 Arty) to provide a barge-mounted capability to support allied forces in the deep Delta. Battery A, 6-77 Arty was attached to the 3-34 Arty until 13 January 1969 when the batteries returned to their parent units. Battery C operated from a semi-permanent land fire base to support an infantry battalion disposed in company strong points along a main road running through the heart of the province. Frequently however, a platoon of howitzers was displaced from its firing platforms. These displacements provided coverage for expanded brigade operations made possible by the increased availability of air assault helicopter assets during the latter half of the period. The coverage problem, though not as serious as the 1-11 Arty's, required the battalion to split its batteries frequently. However, in no case was a battery split in excess of 33 hours. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery remained GS? the 3-34 Arty throughout the period.

d. 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery (2-4 Arty). The Battalion continued to support the 1st Brigade in its TAOI of Long An Province until 13 November when the 3rd Brigade moved to Long An. Both Brigades' operations were aimed at the destruction of the enemy, pacification of Long An Province and interdiction of the important VC commo-liaison routes in the TAOI. With Battery A, 1-84 Arty reinforcing and priority of fire from two GSR non-divisional 155mm howitzer batteries, displacement and splitting of batteries was relatively infrequent. However, during the period of increased threat to Saigon, it was necessary to split Battery A, 2-4 Arty for a period of eight days. On the night of 12-13 December, the Tan Tru base camp (XS6663) was attacked with small arms, B-40's, and 107mm rockets. During the attack Battery C, 2-4 Arty engaged the enemy with both direct and indirect fire. Approximately 600 rounds of shell HE, illuminating and beehive were expended by artillery units in defense of the base camp. A search of the area the next morning disclosed seven unfired 107mm rockets aimed at the base camp. This was the first reported instance of attempted employment of 107mm rockets in a direct fire role in the III Corps Tactical Zone. On 24 December the graves of 32 VC killed in the attack on Tan Tru were discovered and credited to the artillery. On 25 January elements of 5th Bn, 60th Infantry and 2nd Bn, 60th Infantry engaged and encircled part of an estimated force of two NVA companies. The artillery fired 1130 HE rounds into and in the vicinity of the encircled area. The action resulted in 83 VC KIA (nine credited to artillery), and the capture of five POW's, one Ho Chi Minh, 25 individual and 10 crew served weapons.

e. 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery (1-84 Arty). The Battalion provided general support (GS) to the Division. Additionally, it continued to provide fire support coordination for the infantry battalion operating in AO Kudzu, the area surrounding Dong Tam Base, and for the Division Support Command which is charged with the perimeter and internal defense of Dong Tam

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Ease. The battalion also continued to operate Dong Tam Air Warning Control Center. Batteries B and C, 155mm towed, were GSR to the 1-11 Arty and 3-34 Arty respectively, and Battery A, 155mm self-propelled (SP), reinforced the fires of the 2-4 Arty. Battery D, 8" SP, operated from Dong Tam Base with a GS mission, but was often GSR of the 1-11 Arty and occasionally GSR of the 2-4 Arty. The lack of non-divisional artillery in two of the three brigade areas made it necessary to split Battery D also. Battery C operated with three tubes at Ben Tre Airfield (XS4735) and three tubes at Ben Tre Soccer Field (XS5132) until 1 December. Permission was obtained from the Kien Hoa Province Chief to position the entire battery on the soccer field.

f. 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery (6-77 Arty). The Battalion remained assigned to the 54th Artillery Group, attached to the 9th Infantry Division for administration and logistics, and under the operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone. The battalion supported forces operating in the 44th Special Tactical Zone, and the TAOs of the 21st and 9th ARVN Divisions in Chau Doc, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Phong Dinh, and Kien Hoa Provinces. The supported units conducted airmobile, eagle-flight, and ground reconnaissance-in-force operations to interdict VC infiltration routes, locate and destroy VC main force units and penetrate VC base areas. During the period excellent rapport between the 6-77 Arty and supported ARVN units was achieved. The ARVN unit's high degree of confidence in the 6-77 Arty was demonstrated by the increased frequency of requests for extremely close fire support.

g. Attached at Inclosure 1 is a record of ammunition expenditures for the reporting period.

2. (C) Organization.

a. On 31 January the artillery organization for combat was:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
Division Artillery	XS 4143	
Btry B, 5th Bn, 42nd Arty	XS 5469	GSR, 9th Div Arty (Priority to 2nd Bn, 4th Arty)
Btry C, 5th Bn, 42nd Arty	XS 8271	GSR, 9th Div Arty (Priority to 2nd Bn, 4th Arty)
1st Bn, 11th Arty	XS 4143	DS, 1st Brigade
Btry B, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 2650	GSR, 1st Bn, 11th Arty

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Btry D, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 4143	GSR, 1st Bn, 11th Arty
3rd Bn, 34th Arty	XS 4143	DS, 2nd Brigade
Btry C, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 5132	GSR, 3rd Bn, 34th Arty
2nd Bn, 4th Arty	XS 5565	DS, 3rd Brigade
Btry A, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 5132	GSR, 3rd Bn, 34th Arty
1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 4143	GS, 9th Inf Div
6th Bn, 77th Arty	WS 8310	OPCON, SA IV Corps (missions as assigned by SA, IV Corp)
Btry C, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty	XS 4143	GS, 9th Inf Div
2nd Plt, Btry H (SLT), 29th Arty	XS 4143	GS, 9th Inf Div

b. Attached at Inclosure 2 is a roster of commanders of artillery units.

c. Attached at Inclosure 3 is a list of permanent and semi-permanent fire support bases.

3. (C) Personnel and Administration.

a. During November and December, a critical shortage of MOS 13A10 developed in the units of 9th Division Artillery. Two steps were taken to alleviate the shortage. First, 130 infantrymen, who had only a few weeks remaining in country, were assigned to 9th Division Artillery units and given on-the-job-training (OJT) in MOS 13A10. Also, 132 infantrymen, were assigned from the pipeline to 9th Division Artillery units and given OJT in firing battery and fire direction center procedures. The piecemeal infusion of these 262 infantrymen into 9th Division Artillery was necessary because forecasts of trained artillerymen proved to be incorrect. The assignment of short term personnel created some difficulties. To maintain minimum continuity, the assignment of other than artillery MOS enlisted men was essential. Throughout the entire period, the Div Arty operated below its authorized MTOE strength. This situation was further complicated by the fact that the MTOE for the riverine battalions is inadequate, since the 1-11 Arty operates entirely on land and the 3-34 Arty partially on land.

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b. Personnel strength as of 31 January 1969:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
(1) Officer	263	258
(2) Enlisted	2555	2425

c. Critical Grade and MOS Shortages as of 31 January 1969:

(1) Captains	85	71
(2) 1SG	22	18
(3) Mess Sgt	28	23
(4) Supply Sgt	33	8
(5) Section Chief (13B40)	141	109
(6) Motor Sgt	21	11

4. (C) Intelligence.

a. Ground Surveillance Radars. Division Artillery continued to control the employment of its organic AN/TPS 25 plus the Division's two AN/TPS 33 and all seven of its AN/PPS 5 ground surveillance radars. As discussed in the last ORLL, the infantry's AN/PPS 5 radars were hand received to Division Artillery although the radar crews remained assigned to their parent battalions. Partial responsibility for the operation of PPS-5s proved unworkable. Therefore, on 15 November, at the request of the Commanding Officer, Division Artillery, the AN/PPS 5 crews were attached to Division Artillery. Division Artillery thereby assumed complete responsibility for the operation of the Division's AN/PPS 5s. Carefully supervised OJT was conducted in an attempt to insure that crews were highly motivated and equipment meticulously maintained. As a result, the down time of AN/PPS-5s was reduced significantly and the entire operation began to function more smoothly. At the close of the period the Division received seven additional AN/PPS 5s. The Commanding General then directed that the AN/PPS 5s be returned to the infantry. Division Artillery established a school to train the necessary additional crews (see para 5a, below). As the period drew to a close the school was still in operation and the process of returning the AN/PPS 5s was incomplete. Division Artillery continues to man and employ the two AN/TPS 33s. These radars remained in the same location throughout the period and proved highly effective and fairly reliable when not subjected to displacement. However, the generators continued to experience frequent breakdowns.

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b. Counter Mortar Radar. Organized under the riverine artillery battalion MTOE, the 1-11 Arty and 3-24 Arty are not authorized the AN/MPQ 4A radar. Authorization to retain the equipment was obtained, but the lack of personnel spaces and MOS authorizations for the crews created serious problems in maintaining the requisite crew proficiency and proper maintenance. An intensive upgrading effort was instituted which included daily testing and training exercises. Additionally, emphasis was placed on utilizing the radars to conduct registrations to provide crew training, as well as increase the time available for visual reconnaissance by the aerial observers. A proposed MTOE change was submitted to provide an AN/MPQ 4A radar section in the riverine artillery TOE.

5. (U) Training.

a. Ground Surveillance Radar. Air observers were employed to locate targets during the day and crews were then evaluated on their ability to detect and correctly identify the targets. At the close of the period the AN/PPS 5s were returned to the infantry and Division Artillery was directed to conduct a five day course to train additional operators for the infantry battalions. The course consisted of two days of classroom instruction, two days of practical work with radars in field locations and concluded with a one day seminar on operational and maintenance problem areas. Personnel from the 1st Signal Brigade and the 709th Maintenance Battalion assisted Division Artillery in the presentation of the course.

b. FADAC. The services of two civilian instructors were obtained from the 1st Logistical Command during the period 1-24 January. One instructor was an expert in FADAC maintenance and the other in FADAC operations. Functioning as a team, they visited and conducted classes for all units of the Division Artillery.

c. Chemical. Training was conducted to insure that all Division Artillery personnel were proficient in the care and use of the M-17 Protective Mask. The instruction included practical exercises utilizing CS.

6. (U) Logistics. None.

7. (U) Civic Action. The Division Artillery civic action program is summarized in tabular form at Inclosure 4.

Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel. OUT Replacements for Artillery Crewman.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
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a. OBSERVATION. Basic infantrymen received in pipeline replacements proved capable of absorbing OJT as cannoners and fire direction personnel.

b. EVALUATION. When the 9th Infantry Division became critically short of personnel in MOS's 13A10 and 13E10, short term infantry personnel were attached as a temporary solution, however, this action proved wholly unsatisfactory. At a later date, basic infantrymen from the pipeline were assigned to be retrained in artillery MOS's. This OJT program was successful.

c. RECOMMENDATION. When critical shortages must be filled with non-artillery personnel, they should be diverted from the pipeline rather than relying on short term personnel to fill the critical shortages.

2. (C) Operations.

a. Night Hunter Task Force.

(1) OBSERVATION. The 9th Infantry Division is currently employing a new concept for night interdiction operations against enemy forces and logistical traffic. The operation employs a combined arms team to locate and destroy the enemy at night.

(2) EVALUATION. The Night Hunter Task Force is composed of an AN/TPS 25 radar, an air cavalry element, water and/or air mobile infantry elements, and supporting artillery. A command and control element, consisting of infantry and artillery commanders or their SJs, directs the radar search pattern and analyses radar sightings to detect a target complex of sufficient size to warrant the employment of the task force. The force reacts when a suitable target complex is acquired. An artillery time-on-target (TOT) mission is initiated to bring illuminating and VT fuzed high-explosive rounds to bear on one or more of the sightings in the complex. The air cavalry element is vectored to the target area to arrive simultaneously with the artillery TOT. Artillery illumination continues and targets detected by the air cavalry element are engaged with organic weapons until the entire target complex has been searched and neutralized. The infantry elements are maneuvered into areas adjacent to the target complex to engage enemy personnel attempting to flee the area.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That other units in Vietnam employ the Night Hunter Task Forces.

b. The Use of Suppressive Illumination as a Counter Mortar Technique.

(1) OBSERVATION. Mortar attacks occur less frequently when illumination is fired periodically with an aerial observer aloft.

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(3) **RECOMMENDATION.** That during periods of increased danger from mortar attack, illumination be fired as a deterrent. The deterrent is enhanced when aircraft operate over the defended area.

(1) **OBSERVATION.** Consolidation of the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC) and the Division Fire Support Element (FSE) is feasible and desirable when a division operates from a permanent base camp.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That division artilleries operating in Vietnam from permanent base camps consider consolidating their FDC and FSE in the DTOC if sufficient space is available.

(1) OBSERVATION. Employment of qualified artillery aerial observers contributes significantly to timely, efficient and safe employment of artillery fires in close support of maneuver forces.

(2) **EVALUATION.** An aerial observer (AO) can grasp the overall situation far better than a forward observer on the ground. The use of panels, smoke, mirrors, and strobe lights permits the AO to see the disposition of the entire supported force. He can identify populated areas easily and he frequently is able to locate and evaluate the enemy force. The forward observer with the infantry company is often hard pressed to know his own location precisely. It is extremely difficult for the ground FO to determine the disposition of adjacent units and it is nearly impossible for him to know the location of civilians in the area. This is especially true in flat terrain, such as that found in the Delta, where a single

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woodline or building complex can significantly restrict ground observation. The superior capabilities of the AO, as compared to the ground observer, are widely recognized; yet the selection and training of AOs seldom is given sufficient emphasis.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That command emphasis be given to the selection and training of AOs.

3. (U) Organization and Training.

a. Use of Simultaneous Solar Observation to Provide Accurate Firing Battery Orientation.

(1) OBSERVATION. The training of key firing battery personnel in the techniques of simultaneous solar observations with the M2 aiming circle can significantly increase the accuracy of the lay of the battery.

(2) EVALUATION. The basic technique of simultaneous solar observation to determine an accurate azimuth are completely explained in FM 6-2, but are seldom used. When firing batteries move frequently and are widely separated, survey personnel are seldom available to conduct the observation at the battery position. A satisfactory alternative is to train the battery officers and chief of firing battery to operate the battery station using the M2 aiming circle and have survey personnel man the master station at the battalion base camp.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That key firing battery personnel be trained to conduct simultaneous solar observations to improve the accuracy of orienting data.

b. Boresighting with the M1 Collimator.

(1) OBSERVATION. Accurate boresight of howitzers can be accomplished using the M1 Collimator.

(2) EVALUATION. Distant aiming points are not normally available in the Delta area and test targets are bulky, difficult to handle on air-mobile moves, to illuminate at night, and even to position properly in some areas. It was found that boresighting with the M1 Collimator is convenient, consistently accurate, and easily accomplished at night, but has the disadvantage of not providing exact horizontal boresight. As procedures for boresighting with the collimator are not published in any known manual, a workable procedure follows:

(a) Position the howitzer so that the trunnions are level.

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(b) Position the collimator from three to six meters in front of the howitzer.

(c) Prepare the tube for boresighting by installing the boresight disk and muzzle crosshairs.

(d) Level the tube using the gunner's quadrant.

(e) Traverse the howitzer and adjust the collimator so that the boresight disk and crosshairs are aligned with the zero index of the collimator.

(f) Level and cross level the panoramic telescope.

(g) Sight through the panoramic telescope and align any graduation with the same numbered graduation of the collimator.

(h) The deflection scale should now read 3200 mils. If it does not, adjust the panoramic telescope until it reads 3200.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That units equipped with the M1 Collimator use it to boresight their weapons at night or when a more accurate method is not available.

c. Improvement of Gunnery Procedures.

(1) OBSERVATION. The use of a qualified technical assistance team can significantly improve the level of proficiency in firing batteries and fire direction centers.

(2) EVALUATION. Because of rapid personnel turnover, lack of centralized control, and shortages of MOS qualified personnel, high standards of gunnery techniques are difficult to achieve and maintain. Two highly trained and skilled officers from the Division Artillery S3 section were detailed as a full-time technical assistance and inspection team to improve gunnery procedures. Both had recently completed tours as gunnery instructors at the FA School, Ft Sill, one was an FDC instructor and one a firing battery instructor. The team was organized in mid-November and operated continuously, initially spending a minimum of 24 hours with each firing battery. During their visits they supervised OJT and critiqued all aspects of the battery's gunnery procedures. After each visit, the battery and battalion commanders were briefed on the team's findings and suggestions for improvement were provided. Return visits found marked improvement in all areas.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION. That other artillery headquarters consider the formation of a highly qualified technical assistance team to improve firing battery and fire direction proficiency.

d. Radar Maintenance Training.

(1) OBSERVATION. Extra care must be taken in training radar personnel to perform preventive maintenance.

(2) EVALUATION. Since both counter mortar and ground surveillance radar equipment require extensive preventive maintenance, special emphasis must be placed on the subject in the training of radar operators. Experience in the 9th Infantry Division has proved that equipment breakdowns occurred less frequently after an intensive training program was initiated and maintenance was strictly supervised.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend that radar operator training conducted at unit level place extra emphasis on proper preventive maintenance.

4. Intelligence. None.

5. (U) Logistics.

a. XM 548A1 Tracked Cargo Carrier.

(1) OBSERVATION. The Division Artillery's eight-inch howitzer battery experienced many broken windshields in the XM 548A1 Tracked Cargo Carrier.

(2) EVALUATION. The concussion wave created by firing high charges in the eight-inch howitzer caused the windshield glass in the XM 548A1 to crack. By replacing the glass with one-half inch plexiglass, the problem was eliminated. The plexiglass is reasonably hard and durable, and is flexible enough to withstand to concussion of firing.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That glass windshield in the XM 548A1 Tracked Cargo Carrier be replaced with one of plexiglass. An Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) has been submitted.

b. Reducing Vibrations in the PU-422 and PU-532 Generators.

(1) OBSERVATION. The PU-422 and PU-532 generators are more durable when operated on a yielding surface.

(2) EVALUATION. Because of their compactness, light weight, and high operating speeds, the PU-422 and PU-532 generators used with the

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AN/TPS-5 and AN/TPS-33 radar sets will vibrate excessively when operated on the ground. This vibration causes an unacceptable breakdown rate. Placing the generators on a sand bag pad significantly reduced the damage to them due to vibrations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That PU-422 and PU-532 generators be operated on a vibration absorbing surface.

6. (U) Organization.. None .

7. (U) Other. None.

Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information. None.

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R.G. GARD, JR.
Colonel, Field Artillery
Commanding

AVDE-MH (31 January 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)


Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, APO 96370 2 March 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H,
APO 96222

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report
Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the
period ending 31 January 1969.

2. The following modification is added to paragraph 5b(3) of the 9th
Infantry Division Artillery: The recommendation to place these generators
on a vibration absorbing surface when being operated has been investigated
and the idea seems sound in theory. However, although the solution offered
(placing the generators on sand bags) has merit, it should only be used as
a field expedient. The design of the engine intakes produces the possibility
that sand from the bags could be drawn into the engine air intake manifold.
It is believed possible to design a coil-suspended angle iron base on which
the generator could be mounted providing an even greater vibration-absorbing
capability. Due to the importance of this suggestion, a technical representa-
tive from the USARV Customer Assistance Team (Mr. John A. Smith--currently
assigned to the 709th Maintenance Battalion) will attempt to design and
build one model of the proposed base to issue on an experimental basis.
If the model is successful, an EIR will be submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


A. P. HANKET
COL, CE
Acting Chief of Staff

AVFBC-RE-H (31 Jan 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, (RCS/CSFOR-65)(UIC-WDF3-AA)(U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 24 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the period ending
31 January 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B. G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

1
AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 January 1969, (RCS CSFOR-65)(UIC-WDF3-AA)(U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963753 1 MAR

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 9th
Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the report as modified by
the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
9th Inf Div Arty
II FFV

GPOP-DT (31 Jan 69) 4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 APR 1969

TC: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. E. HOLEYFIELD
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		4a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		Confidential
		2b. GROUP
		4
2. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 9th Infantry Division Artillery		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 9th Infantry Division Artillery		
3. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
31 January 1969	20	
6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	6b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	691222	
b. PROJECT NO.		
c. N/A	6c. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR; DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

18

DD FORM 1473
1 NOV 68

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification